

10 Germ Warfare and Patriotic *Weisheng*

March tempo, vigorously, with intense anger:

American imperialism, monstrously evil!

As it approaches the edge of doom,

It dares to use germ warfare against the people of China and Korea!

crescendo to fortissimo:

American imperialism, monstrously evil!

For the sake of the future of mankind,

We resolve to wipe out germ warfare.

Wipe out germ warfare!

Wipe it out!

Wipe it out!

Wipe out germ warfare, capture the germ warfare criminals,

Finish off the American imperialists and their stinking bugs
and flies!

Wipe out germ warfare, capture the germ warfare criminals,

All of China, the whole world, must mobilize as one! Must mobilize
as one!

“Wipe Out Germ Warfare!”

Words by GUO MORUO, Tune by LU JI

To be performed at Patriotic Hygiene Campaign mass meetings

In the winter of 1952, reports of American use of germ warfare in the Korean War hit the front pages of newspapers throughout the People's Republic of China. Government sources accused “American imperialists” (*Mei di*) of using biological weapons against innocent civilian populations in Manchuria. Radio addresses, banners, posters, and public announcements urged the populace to rise and fight against the evil insects, spiders, and bacteria that threatened to spread pestilence within China's borders. The weapon the Communists wielded against germ warfare was *weisheng*. Like the vision that had been embraced before by regimes throughout the twentieth century, this *weisheng* included personal cleanliness, environmental sanitation, compulsory vaccinations, suspicion of insects, and the scrutiny of germs. To a greater degree than any other public health movement in China, this *weisheng* also entailed mass mobilization through an unprecedented appeal to nationalism through the “Aiguo weisheng yundong”: the Patriotic Hygiene Campaign.

The threat of germ warfare and the Patriotic Hygiene Campaign provided an opportunity for the Communist government to mobilize multiple levels of society. Workers, housewives, professors, and doctors dredged sewers, swatted flies, picked up garbage, and submitted to vaccinations in order to eliminate germs and defend the nation. If modernity for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) meant that all citizens should be hypervigilant, intensely aware, and physically involved in the life of the nation, then hygienic modernity under the conditions of a biological threat was an excellent vehicle for the realization of this vision.

Whether the Patriotic Hygiene Campaign was launched in response to a real threat or was part of an elaborate hoax orchestrated by Communist leaders matters little from the perspective of this study.¹ The Patriotic Hygiene Campaign remains significant as both a continuation and culmination of the history of *weisheng* in urban China. The campaign was in many ways a continuation of the lectures, movements, and programs that treaty-port elites, Christian missionaries, and governments had been supporting for decades. The post-1949 *weisheng* message was a continuation from previous years, its content on germs and disease remarkably similar to the content of education programs from the 1910s, the Nanjing decade, and the Japanese occupation period. As in every period before 1949, the Communist government maintained an ideal of hygienic modernity, then struggled to achieve it with limited resources and personnel.

At the same time, the 1952 *weisheng* campaign represented an extreme version of the hygienic modernity that had gone before. In the past, hundreds of thousands of urban Chinese had been exposed to the message of *weisheng*. In 1952, millions of urban Chinese actively did *weisheng*. “Doing *weisheng*” included killing flies, dredging sewers, and picking up trash. Through the Patriotic Hygiene Campaign, consciousness of dirt and germs became manifest through an official language that became part of daily life, and *weisheng* became inextricably locked into association with cleanliness. Government agents monitored hygienic performance through public rallies and household inspections. Though a part of hygiene campaigns in the past (for example, the door-to-door inspections in Tianjin’s Japanese Concession and under Japanese occupation), the penetration of state agents into private life became an accepted and routine part of life under the Communists.

The documentary record of alleged germ warfare attacks and the Patriotic Hygiene Campaign in the city of Tianjin provides a unique window into the governance and society of the early PRC. The germ warfare allegations and Patriotic Hygiene Campaign emerged within the highly charged political context of the early 1950s urban environment. During this uncertain,

transitional time, the Communist government sought ways to modernize and rationalize urban society—to make it transparent and more permeable and to bring individuals into direct contact with the state. The Communist goal was aided by the powerful metaphor of germs as invisible enemies. This metaphor had been used since the early republican period, but China's experience during the Japanese occupation made it far more evocative of a potential reality. By waging war against germs throughout northern China's cities, the rural-based CCP could portray itself as a wielder of modern scientific knowledge, able to visualize, classify, and contain enemy germs hidden in insects, dirt, and in the bodies of individual Chinese. They did so not in the name of ruthless control and tyranny, but in the name of national defense and the pursuit of modernity.

HIDDEN DANGERS AND THE PURSUIT OF POLITICAL PURITY

On January 15, 1949, the Nationalist Army defending Tianjin surrendered to the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Compared to many other cities in China over the previous twelve years, Tianjin had been spared the ravages of war. Tianjin had exchanged hands three times since the Japanese invasion, but much of the fighting had taken place in the outer reaches of the city. Realizing they could not protect the city's core from the tens of thousands of troops the Communists had amassed outside the city, the Nationalists surrendered without fighting. This quick surrender meant that Tianjin's industries, banks, and mansions were spared the destruction of war. The new regime's task was not to rebuild a city, but to understand and ultimately control a city that had survived in all its complexity.² This complexity no longer included foreign concessions: The last of the imperial outposts were officially dissolved in 1943, and after the defeat of Japan, Tianjin became a city entirely administered by Chinese.

Tianjin was an important challenge for the rural-based Chinese Communists' shift to urban administration. Tianjin was north China's largest port, a finance and transportation hub that served as the link between the sea and Beijing, and between the south and Manchuria's vast resources. By the time it was "liberated," Tianjin's population of approximately four million had swelled with two hundred thousand civilian refugees and over one hundred thousand Nationalist troops, including thousands of undisciplined army deserters who had fled to Tianjin from battle zones in Manchuria. Landmines lurked under fields and roads, city neighborhoods remained blockaded in anticipation of street-to-street combat, and residents were fear-

ful of the all-too-familiar postwar combination of rogue soldiers, commodity shortages, and hyperinflation. Into this confused and tense situation, the CCP dispatched a minute force of approximately seventy-four hundred civilian cadres, many of whom had just recently received crash courses in urban administration. This small core of small-town students, ex-farmers, and CCP underground operatives was charged with taking over all of Tianjin's urban functions and bringing the chaotic city under control.³

It is not surprising that the CCP was suspicious of Tianjin. Tianjin's defenses had collapsed in a remarkably short time, leaving many Nationalist troops, administrators, and sympathizers trapped within the city. For the Communists, GMD spies lurked everywhere: among poverty-stricken refugees, army deserters, students, clerks, and bureaucrats.⁴ For this countrified Communist force (which had yet to capture Shanghai and other southern cities), Tianjin also represented the first encounter with a large treaty-port society, the very definition of foreign-influenced danger and decadence against which the Communists claimed to be fighting. Under the Japanese occupation, Tianjin had been the center of opium trade in north China, and certain neighborhoods within the city still teemed with opium shops and dealers. Tianjin had long been a center for various "heterodox" religious movements, many of which had elaborate hierarchies of command and membership. Guild/gangs, such as those that organized transportation workers, controlled many of Tianjin's most important services. All of these elements were suspicious, not only because they represented alternate networks of power to the government, but also because they represented the anathema of the Communist vision of a pure, New China. Although they had gained experience dealing with cities in Manchuria, Tianjin's urban landscape represented a new level of complexity and obscurity.

Adding to the complexity of the situation, hostilities broke out between U.N. (American) forces and North Korea less than eighteen months after Tianjin had been "liberated." By the fall of 1950, Chinese troops were fighting Americans on the bitter Korean front, across the Bohai Gulf from Tianjin. War in Korea intensified the CCP dread of internal enemies lurking in inscrutable and impenetrable urban spaces.

The fear of political impurity and invisible enemies shaped CCP actions in Tianjin from Liberation through the early 1950s. Immediately after taking the city, PLA troops and cadres set about rounding up Nationalist soldiers and shipping potentially disruptive refugees back to their homes in the countryside.⁵ The great "cleanup" of Tianjin continued in 1950–51 with the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries (*Zhenya fangeming yundong*).⁶ In this campaign, the CCP arrested thousands of gang leaders,

TABLE 3. Major Political Campaigns in Tianjin, 1949–53

<i>Campaign</i>	<i>Date</i>
Suppress Counterrevolutionaries I	Spring–Fall 1949
Resist America, Aid Korea	October 1950–July 1953
Suppress Counterrevolutionaries II*	February–July 1951
Three-Anti Campaign	December 1951–June 1952
Five-Anti Campaign	January–June 1952
Thought Reform Campaign	November 1951–June 1952
Patriotic Hygiene Campaign	February–July 1952

*This campaign included movements against prostitutes, drug dealers, and religious sects.

drug smugglers, religious sect leaders, and alleged Nationalist spies, and executed hundreds. A wide-scale program was launched to crack down on petty criminals, beggars, and prostitutes.⁷ Several new campaigns arose in 1952 that were aimed at the professional classes. The Five-Anti Campaign was designed to undermine the authority of China's capitalists and managers by targeting the five "crimes" of bribery, tax evasion, theft of state property, cheating on contracts, and stealing state economic information. The Three-Anti Campaign sought to rectify three "common defects" of Communist cadres: corruption, waste, and "obstructionist bureaucracy." Finally, the Thought Reform Movement (Sixiang gaizao yundong) penetrated institutions of higher education and professional services. Intellectuals who had previously thought of themselves as benignly progressive or politically neutral now had to announce their allegiance to the masses publicly and undergo "consciousness raising" to ensure a proper outlook.⁸

All of these campaigns sought to eliminate the strength of nonstate organizations and replace diffuse hierarchies of authority in civil society with direct ties of loyalty (and control) between the individual and the state. Ultimately the overlapping of so many campaigns resulted in a concentrated atmosphere of suspicion and confusion in many sectors of Chinese society (see table 3 for a detailed chronology). In mass meetings, radio broadcasts, and daily newspapers, the state called upon the populace to expose evildoers, confess crimes, and eliminate "poisonous germs" (*dujun*) from the body politic. Constant media repetition of the words *tanwu* (corruption) and *tanbai* (confession) made aural and visual messages of pollution (*wu*) and purity (*bai*) the predominant motifs of the early 1950s. From 1949 to 1952, as the state executed GMD spies, compelled businessmen and bureaucrats to confess to crimes, and purged cadres of incorrect thoughts, vectors of po-

litical contagion were eliminated, and society was inoculated against internal pathogens.

THE HEALTH OF THE CITY

While the Communists tended to the political “health” of the city, the corporal health of the city was also a major concern. Alleviating the illnesses of the poor was one of the commitments of the Communist Revolution. In Tianjin, cadres consciously pursued health policies that would visibly demonstrate the benefits of their regime to the masses. The Communists inherited a city whose health was divided. In certain areas, most residents drank tap water and had adequate nutrition. In other areas, people drank water out of stagnant ponds and faced starvation. In 1949, infectious diseases such as tuberculosis, neonatal tetanus, dysentery, and encephalitis were the most common causes of death in Tianjin, the result of poverty, poor nutrition, inadequate housing, contaminated water supply, and a dearth of obstetric services and infant care. Epidemics still loomed even after Liberation. A small but alarming outbreak of bubonic plague in Manchuria threatened Tianjin in the winter of 1949. In the summer of 1950, a cholera epidemic swept through the city.⁹

Although Communist histories suggest that the CCP brought public health to cities that had previously been devoid of any organizational infrastructure, the Communists in Tianjin actually inherited a system of district health stations, public hospitals, and isolation hospitals from the Nationalists, who had in turn built their infrastructure on warlord and concession governments from previous decades.¹⁰ Tianjin was a city with relatively abundant medical resources. The problem was their unequal distribution. To solve these all-too-familiar public health problems, a great deal of work would have to be done to raise basic standards of living and to build up a public health infrastructure; improvements that would require a tremendous investment of time, money, and personnel from the new government.

The new Tianjin municipal health bureau tackled these problems with considerable enthusiasm but limited resources. The bureau adjusted its priorities to reflect the realities of the situation: (1) place prevention above treatment; (2) promote a “serve the people” mentality in health workers; (3) cultivate more health workers with a basic level of education; and (4) pay attention to the laboring masses.¹¹ The way the bureau attempted to fulfill these goals can be summarized by examining their actions at two sites of *weisheng*: water supply and the management of hospitals.

The new municipal health bureau placed considerable emphasis on the provisioning of water for the city's poor. The Communists had taken over the Native City Waterworks, but tens of thousands of people in the city were not serviced by this network. According to a water-use survey conducted in the spring of 1950, 1,619,922 people in Tianjin, or 89 percent of the city's population, used treated water, mostly water purchased from neighborhood water shops. But 96,921 people still drank water that came directly from the river, and 4,761 poverty-stricken people drank from local ponds/cesspools. The survey paid particular attention to the south branch of the Grand Canal, traditionally the source of Tianjin's drinking water. The Communists were appalled by what they found. Water carriers still took water from the canal at dozens of locations, but more than one hundred sewage ditches drained into the canal near these sites. Toilets, pigpens, and garbage lined both sides of the canal.¹²

The health bureau recognized that it would be impossible to extend the water supply network to serve everyone in Tianjin before the next summer "cholera season" arrived. Instead, they devised a plan to use boats with water tanks aboard to distribute clean water to the poor living along the banks of the Grand Canal. The inexperienced cadres who had devised the plan had not thought through all the details of the actual execution. It took several months to find the funding to rent the boats and pay the laborers necessary to launch the scheme. Once the huge water tanks were hoisted aboard, the boats rocked so violently that they almost tipped over. It took several more weeks before this engineering problem could be solved and water could finally be distributed to the city's poor.¹³

People were grateful, progress reports stated, and yet the poor had other complaints. The Communists had put their emphasis on the provisioning of clean drinking water and the management of the urban infrastructure, the very things that had been relatively neglected by previous administrations. But when cadres went into the poor neighborhoods, they were surprised to find that people complained about the Communist's lack of commitment to the poor. Remarkably, their criterion for a concerned government revolved around the hypodermic needle. "Before Liberation," poor residents were reported as saying, "the government was constantly coming here and vaccinating us. But after Liberation we don't have the chance to be 'hit by the needle' [*da zhen*]. The government is not paying as much attention to us."¹⁴ Through the Nationalist and Japanese occupation regimes, *weisheng* became associated with vaccination. It would take several more months before the Communist health infrastructure would produce enough vaccines to resume the type of mass vaccination schedules that the poor had begun to see as a marker of government benevolence.

At the opposite end of the public health hierarchy, the Communists gradually took over Tianjin's foreign hospitals. This phase involved the judicious handling of the most sophisticated medical elites in the city: the Chinese physicians who worked in Tianjin's various missionary hospitals and the large Mackenzie Memorial Hospital in the British Settlement. In preparation for making the hospitals part of the state-owned public health network, the CCP sent cadres to take inventories of all the equipment and staff of each hospital. The Communists then secretly cultivated informants within the hospitals to collect information on any anti-CCP comments or appearance of any *qin Mei* (close with America) attitudes among hospital staff.¹⁵ Communists were particularly suspicious of the political sentiments of Chinese physicians who had worked with foreigners. Not only were they solidly bourgeois, but they also saw the foreign presence in China as a benevolent phenomenon. *Qin Mei* attitudes were considered highly subversive in the environment of the Korean War and the recent germ warfare attacks in Manchuria.¹⁶

Communist suspicion of Western-trained physicians was a theme of *Minglang de tian* (Bright skies), a 1954 play by the famous Tianjin playwright, Cao Yu. Cao Yu spent his career criticizing foreign imperialism; his best known work, *Richu* (Sunrise, 1935), was a drama, set in the Tianjin French Concession's Grand Hotel, that exposed the decadent ways of foreign-influenced Chinese. *Bright Skies* is set in an American-founded hospital in Beijing (obviously modeled on Peking Union Medical College). There Communist cadres try to guide foreign-trained Chinese physicians to understand the evil nature of foreign imperialism. The hospital's chief bacteriologist, Dr. Ling, refuses to believe that his former colleagues were evil until he is convinced by evidence of American germ warfare. Inspired to patriotism, he takes up his microscope to serve his country by joining medical workers on the Korean front. "This microscope has been keeping me company for thirty years, all for nothing," muses Dr. Ling. "Now . . . the time has come for me to render some real service to my country and make my microscope really useful."¹⁷ Dr. Ling's recalcitrance and his eventual embrace of the Communist spirit of "serving the people" reflected one of the major goals of the Patriotic Hygiene Campaign: the mobilization of the entire nation—including the nation's medical elites—to fight against imperialism through the vehicle of health and hygiene. The metaphor of "enemies as germs" had shaped and sustained the Communist's first attempts at intervening in local society—the campaigns that focused on specific groups such as prostitutes, capitalists, and cadres. Now the idea of "germs as enemies" would offer a new vehicle for an even more widespread intervention, one that

would encompass both housewives and professors, factory workers and physicians.

GERM WARFARE AND THE PATRIOTIC HYGIENE CAMPAIGN

The first official news of germ warfare in the Korean War came on February 23, 1952, when the *People's Daily* carried a front-page editorial denouncing "the appalling crime of the American aggressors in Korea in using bacteriological warfare." Daily reports of germ warfare activities continued throughout February. The campaign against the United States gained worldwide recognition on March 8, 1952, when Zhou Enlai issued a statement through the Hsinhua News Agency calling upon all nations to condemn the "U.S. Imperialists' War Crime" of germ warfare (*xijun zhan*). The inflammatory rhetoric heightened in intensity after reports announced that the United States had extended germ warfare into China as far south as Qingdao.¹⁸

Internal documents of the Tianjin municipal health bureau record eight germ-warfare attacks experienced by the city in the summer of 1952. The case presented below is particularly rich in detail, but is typical in most aspects:

Case #4: June 9, 1952. Insects were first discovered at noon near the pier at the Tanggu Workers Union Hall. At 12:40 P.M., insects were discovered at the New Harbor Works Department, and at 1:30, in Beitang town. Insects were spread over an area of 2,002,400 square meters in New Harbor, and for over twenty Chinese miles [approximately ten kilometers] along the shore at Beitang. Insect elimination was carried out under the direction of the Tianjin Municipal Disinfection Team [Xiaodu dui; literally, Poison Eradication Team]. Masses organized to assist in catching insects included 1,586 townspeople, 300 soldiers, and 3,150 workers. Individual insects were collected and then burned, boiled, or buried. Insect species included inchworms, snout moths, wasps, aphids, butterflies . . . giant mosquitoes, etc. Samples of the insects were sent to the Central Laboratory in Beijing, where they were found to be infected with typhoid bacilli, dysentery bacilli, and para-typhoid.¹⁹

Many of the Tianjin cases displayed a heightened visual scrutiny of nature in action. According to internal reports, the initial sightings of potential germ-warfare vectors came from vigilant citizens. Internal reports indicate that these sightings were not the result of plants or hoaxes, but that citizen-activists spotted what they considered to be biological anomalies in the natural environment. To these vigilant observers, insects not only sud-

denly appeared before the eye, they loomed large and menacing as inherently evil carriers of deadly germs.

Months of reports, accusations, and propaganda that saturated the Chinese media during the germ warfare allegations seemed to have produced this heightened visual awareness of the natural environment. New ways of seeing the smallest of insects—and imagining in the mind's eye the existence of invisible bacteria they might contain—had been fostered by a barrage of microscopic representations in the national media. Newspaper reports also prominently featured entomological descriptions of antennae, wings, and mandibles of the insects that threatened China. Close-up photographs of invading flies, fleas, mosquitoes, and other less-recognizable species were published together with numerous political cartoons featuring insects and rodents.²⁰ These cartoons depicted U.S. imperialism as a Grim Reaper riding the back of a housefly (see Fig. 10), or showed Western political leaders releasing diseased rats upon the Chinese population. In addition, a large-scale exhibit on the “American war crime of germ warfare” toured major cities throughout China in the spring of 1952. The national exhibit arrived in Tianjin on March 12, 1952, and was seen by almost two hundred thousand individuals. Among its many images, the exhibit featured large magnifications of insect heads with hairy antennae and multicompartment eyes, looming dark and menacing over audiences of school children and workers.²¹

Exhibits and newspapers also rendered microbes visible to a mass audience. Depictions of bacteria appeared in a variety of manifestations: as streaks on the surfaces of petri dishes, as cloudy masses suspended in test tubes, and as stained rods appearing in the circular field of a microscope. These images invited viewers to come face to face with invisible agents of death. Colonies of anthrax and plague bacteria, captured and cultured by Communist authorities, simultaneously alarmed viewers and assured them that the People's science had the skill to contain the threat. Seen by millions of people throughout China, such images defined an insect, rodent, and bacterial menace. Objects once unseen or unnoticed in nature now threatened the very existence of the new nation.

There is no direct evidence that the Patriotic Hygiene Campaign was launched in order to improve shortcomings in domestic public health. The fear of germ-warfare attacks was palpably real. And yet in Tianjin, it is clear that the Patriotic Hygiene Campaign helped to rectify, at least temporarily, the problems of the city's public health administration. Hygiene education became the main subject in newspapers, radio addresses, and public lectures. Officials at the highest levels placed priority on public health work. Build-



Figure 10. "The Washington Plague." Korean-War era cartoon depicting the Grim Reaper leading a swarm of pestilential flies out of the U.S. Capitol building. *Fujian ribao* (Fujian daily), 30 March 1952.

ing on republican-era precedent, the government established its own system of public health stations (*weisheng zhan*), thus providing a higher profile for the new government's public health bureau in the city's more peripheral neighborhoods. The CCP took advantage of the patriotism of the moment to harmonize relations between the relatively uneducated cadres who administered the health department and the city's more sophisticated medical professionals who chafed at being under their direction. Yet most important for a cash-strapped and personnel-deficient program, the mass mobilizations of the Patriotic Hygiene Campaign turned average citizens into an army of volunteer public health and sanitation workers. By the summer of 1952, hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children stood poised to annihilate the biological and environmental enemies of New China.

The Patriotic Hygiene Campaign consisted of two major phases: the Five

Annihilations (Wu mie) and the Big Cleanup (Da qingsao).²² The Five Annihilations resulted in the formation of mass armies arrayed against nature's tiny vectors of imperialism. In the spring of 1952, China's citizens were called upon to eliminate the Five Pests: flies, mosquitoes, mice and rats, lice, and bedbugs.²³ Even when germ warfare attacks were not suspected, individuals in factories, offices, and schools throughout China were expected to kill and count any creeping or flying life-form they encountered.

The insect extermination teams detailed in Tianjin's germ-warfare-attack reports exemplify the grand scale of the Five Annihilations mobilizations. In these public performances, thousands of workers and soldiers were equipped with gauze masks, cotton sacks, gloves, and chopsticks and then directed to scour hundreds of acres of land for suspicious insects. Individuals picked up insects one by one from the ground with their chopsticks and stuffed them into their collection sacks. The bug harvest was then turned over to public health officials for counting, analysis, and destruction. Rodents, too, were targeted for systematic annihilation. Unlike insects, which were to be captured by hand, rats were killed with traps and poisons. In spite of this distancing from the actual death of larger vermin, rat annihilation did contain a hands-on element. Today elderly Tianjin residents still recall chopping off the tails of hundreds of dead rats—the harvest from one neighborhood's Five Annihilations exercise—to facilitate tabulation by public health authorities.²⁴

In the Big Cleanup phase of the campaign, women and others who labored inside the home were mobilized to clear, dredge, and sweep the city clean. In Tianjin, hundreds of thousands of housewives, joined by university and high school students, helped to clear miles of the city's stagnant and odiferous drainage canals.²⁵ Residents supplied with picks, shovels, and shoulder-poles filled in more than seven hundred cesspools, one bucketful of soil at a time. Neighborhood cleanups removed tons of trash from domestic interiors and from public spaces: old derelict temples, opera halls, and street corners.

A combination of peer pressure, sociability, and patriotism created this unprecedented mobilization of the undermobilized. The government employed neighborhood committees, household visits, and persistent "sleeping platform" (*kangtou*) discussions to convince housewives, retirees, and others to concern themselves with domestic hygiene. Household labor was monitored through committee inspection of domestic interiors. At the same time, neighborhood committees also organized women to sweep streets and do washing out of doors. These neighborhood groups may have had a certain social appeal, as they resembled more convivial rural settings for

women's domestic work. Without a certain element of patriotism and a sense of contributing to the nation, however, it is difficult to see how so many housewives could have labored shoulder to shoulder with high school and college students in Tianjin's numerous sewer-dredging bucket brigades.²⁶

As the Patriotic Hygiene Campaign came to a close, cadres evaluated its success. Hundreds of thousands of people had been vaccinated, tons of garbage had been removed, and tens of thousands of people had participated in mass insect killings and cleanups. Nevertheless, officials were disappointed at the rates of participation and realized that more had to be done to maintain the hygienic vigilance of the population. In 1953, Tianjin's Patriotic Hygiene Campaign Committee developed newer, more tempting incentives to encourage participation in the second round of annihilations and cleanups. Individuals who achieved the designation of "hygienic exemplar" (*weisheng mofang*) would be offered more money, more attractive crimson banners, and more privileges than in the previous year.

The Patriotic Hygiene Campaign was born at a moment when the CCP portrayed germs as foreign enemies rather than as a part of an indigenous Chinese terrain of deficiency. For a moment, the enemy that had to be overcome in order for China to achieve sovereignty and modernity was one from without, not one from within. The path to *weisheng* became indigenized, represented by a healthy cadre whose years in the countryside had given him robust features and a genuine concern for the Chinese people. Nevertheless, the standards taken up by the Chinese Communists for the new nation were still primarily those of modern biomedicine. Moreover, from the perspective of the new regime, the campaign ultimately failed to produce an adequately hygienic populace: deficiencies still lurked beneath the surface of patriotism. During the 1952 mobilizations, there was considerable foot dragging and ignoring of the government's objectives. For every *jiji fenzi* (activist from local society) who joined a neighborhood domestic hygiene inspection team, there were many more who failed to see any connection whatsoever between sweeping the floor and defending the nation against germs.²⁷ Apparently fear of biological weapons was not an entirely adequate motivation to compel the masses to become hygienically modern.

For the CCP, the gap between an individually internalized state of hygienic modernity and China's reality continued to exist well past the 1950s. The Patriotic Hygiene Campaign outlasted the Korean War germ warfare allegations and extended into the years of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. The campaign continues even today in a postsocialist China. Its basic goal remains to "change habits, improve customs, and transform the nation," a massive task accomplished by simultaneously promot-

ing hygiene and eradicating the Four Pests. Officials still hold that the Patriotic Hygiene Campaign had not only been necessary in the past, when China's economy and culture were "backward," but is necessary even today in an era of "improving livelihoods and advancing levels of civilization."²⁸ In the eyes of the Communist regime, *weisheng* is still something that resides at some distance away from the Chinese people.

CONCLUSION

The goals of the Patriotic Hygiene Campaign represented the culmination of the goals of *weisheng* since Nagayo Sensai first used the word to summarize an essential technology of modernity. In the Patriotic Hygiene Campaign the health of the individual was equated with the health of the nation. The threat to the corporal nation was portrayed as a threat to the individual body as "foreign" germs penetrated New China's borders. In order to maintain the integrity of the nation's health, individuals were mobilized to act as though their own health was inseparable from the health of the collective. This was a vision of hygienic modernity held dear by Japanese bureaucrats, late Qing reformers, GMD modernizers, and CCP cadres alike: a system that combined government institutions and individual participation to form the basis of a national health. Achieving this national health would in turn guarantee the status and sovereignty of the nation against the threat of foreign imperialism.

The Patriotic Hygiene Campaign's technique of intensive intervention into society in the name of *weisheng* was not a new Communist phenomenon. The government-mandated lectures and propaganda meetings of 1952 would have been familiar to anyone who had lived through the GMD's New Life Movement. Government-mandated inspections of homes, conducted by local elites on behalf of the state, would have been biannual occurrences for anyone who had lived in the Japanese Concession of Tianjin during the 1920s and 1930s, and was experienced by everyone in the city during the Japanese occupation. The mass vaccinations of hundreds of thousands of people during the Patriotic Hygiene Campaign were also nothing new to Tianjiners; voluntary vaccination against smallpox had begun in the mid-nineteenth century, and the administration with hypodermic needles of mandatory vaccinations to the masses was a phenomenon that had begun as early as the warlord period and reached a high point during the Japanese occupation. Indeed, by the end of the first half of the twentieth century, the intervention of the government in policing and promoting health—one crucial aspect of

weisheng—was not something that automatically inspired resistance in Tianjin, but had instead become a basic criterion that determined a government's legitimacy.

Urban residents may have clearly expected their governments to have a responsibility for the *weisheng* of the city by 1952, but it is not entirely clear to what extent their participation in the Patriotic Hygiene Campaign represented an internalized embrace of the state's hygienic goals. All hygiene education, from the programs of the YMCA to the policies of Japanese colonial administration, had sought to produce new citizens through the inculcation of new modes of decorum and cleanliness. It would be a sign of desirable modern governmentality if the state no longer needed to "enforce *weisheng* [*eisei*] where it was lacking," as determined Japanese administrators vowed to do in the aftermath of Japan's 1877–79 cholera epidemic. Armed soldiers attempted to force young men to relieve themselves in designated spots during the 1900–1902 occupation of Tianjin and similar indiscretions remained a crime under Chinese administration, but generations of reformers still hoped that education could ultimately supplant policing to produce hygienically modern individuals and a hygienically modern society. Embattled modernizers of the Nationalist era questioned the progress that common Chinese had made toward this goal, in spite of various efforts at generating hygienic "uplift" like Chiang Kai-shek's New Life Movement. Some thinkers, such as the eugenicist Pan Guangdan, proclaimed the entire "uplift" enterprise a folly: China's governments would be doomed to forever indoctrinating an unfit Chinese Everyman in a hygienic modernity that he was incapable of achieving. Rather than pursue a course of altering behaviors, Pan counseled the alteration of genetic material as the only way out for China. The CCP has proved itself an inheritor of both the optimistic program of the GMD New Life reformer and the hardnosed scientific pessimism of republican-era eugenicists. As Frank Dikötter has pointed out, the present-day government of the PRC combines massive propaganda campaigns on health and well-being with explicit eugenics laws that require the sterilization of married individuals deemed genetically "unfit."²⁹ *Weisheng* once tutored individuals in the art of producing healthy and numerous progeny through the imbibing of medicines and the nurturing of vitalities. In the twentieth century, *weisheng* compelled the state to create a hygienically modern nation in order to counter the specter of national deficiency.